In this note, I propose a normative updating rule, extended Bayesianism, for the incorporation of probabilistic information arising from the process of becoming more aware.
The tenet of reverse Bayesianism (RB), as introduced by Karni and Vierø (2013) , states that when the DM becomes more aware, her probabilistic assessments regarding previously understood contingencies do not change. Formally: π 1 (E) = π 0 (E) for all E ∈ Σ 0 , so that π 1 is an extension of π 0 to the richer algebra.
2 Thus, RB essentially posits that becoming more aware is not in and of itself informative-learning how to distinguish between new events does not provide any probabilistic information regarding the likelihood of those events previously understood. * Royal Holloway, University of London, Department of Economics, evan.piermont@rhul.ac.uk 1 There are no intrinsic problems in entertaining uncountable state spaces. The conditions stated in this paper are in spirit all that is needed. However, care needs to taken as the support of a measure is no longer well defined (without, e.g., additional topological restrictions) so conditioning events are identified only up to sets of measure zero.
2 In Karni and Vierø (2013) , there are actually two distinct ways the DM can become more aware, refinement, which is essentially what is characterized here, and expansion where by the underlying state-space gets larger. It seems to me that allowing the state-space to expand is fundamentally at odds with the natural definition of a state space as a representation of all decision relevant states of affairs. One can diffuse this tension and represent expansions via refinements by setting an event E ⋆ ∈ Σ 0 to collect "that which is not yet understood." E ⋆ gets carved up with each new discovery. This latter method has the added benefit of allowing the DM to reason about her own unawareness.
There are many intuitive situations, however, where becoming aware intrinsically does provide information. Incontrovertibly, if the DM becomes aware of an event E, she must learn that she used to be unaware of E.
3 But, even without appealing to introspection, it is reasonable that the mere existence of a concept can serve as evidence regarding contingencies the DM was already aware of. This is essentially the "problem of old evidence" (Glymour, 1980) . Example 1. Players i and j are playing a card game. i initially thinks it is highly likely that he fully understands the rules of the game, and further that j's behavior is not rationalizable according to these rules. Hence i believes its is highly likely that j is irrational. i then discovers that there are in fact two variants of the game. Although i does not learn any hard information about the rules of either variant, he now places much less probability on the event that he fully understands the rules (of the game j believes they are playing), and therefore less probability on the event that j is irrational.
Even if becoming aware does not intrinsically change beliefs, it may well be that by the time the DM's beliefs can actually be elicited, she has taken into account some additional probabilistic information. That is to say, despite the DM adhering to RB, the beliefs elicited at time 1 reflect not only the expansion of awareness but also conventional updating.
Definition. Say that (π 1 , π 0 ) satisfies extended Bayesianism (EB), if there exists a probability distributionπ on (Ω, Σ 1 ) such that
ec2π(E) = π 0 (E) for all E ∈ Σ 0 , and
An interpretation is as follows: If (π 0 , π 1 ) satisfies EB it is as if π 1 was constructed by conditioning π 0 on the event S 1 . We say 'as if' because when S 1 / ∈ Σ 0 then the π 0 probability of S 1 is undefined. However, in this case, we make sense of conditioning by first extending π 0 to the richer algebra (π 0 →π) and then constructing π 1 by conditioning this extension (π → π 1 ). The overall transition (π 0 → π 1 ) satisfies reverse Bayesianism if and only if S 1 = Ω so that the conditioning step is trivial and satisfies canonical Bayesianism if Σ 0 = Σ 1 so that the discovered evidence was expected at time 0.
Example 2. Let Σ 0 = {ω 1 , ω 2 , ω 3 }, Σ 0 be generated by the partition {{ω 1 }, {ω 2 , ω 3 }} and Σ 1 by the discrete partition. Let π 0 be given by
Figure 1: A visual representation of the state space from Example 4.
Example 4. Let Ω = N × {A, B} with Σ 0 generated by N and Σ 0 by the discrete partition. Set π 0 (E 0 ) = 1 2 and π 0 (E n ) = 3 −n for n > 0. Set π 1 (E 0A ) = π 1 (E nB ) = 0 and π 0 (E nA ) = 2 −n for all n > 0 (see figure 1) . Then (π 0 , π 1 ) does not satisfy EB.
Fixing S 0 and S 1 (and, of course, the state space and sigma algebras) there may be multiple π 0 's such that (π 0 , π 1 ) satisfies EB for a fixed π 1 (namely those priors that keep the relative likelihoods of events within S 1 equal). Also, there might be multiple π 1 's such that (π 0 , π 1 ) satisfies EB for a fixed π 0 (namely those posteriors that ascribe different probabilities to E ∈ Σ 1 \ Σ 0 ).
Observability
Bayesian updating is the normative benchmark for how probabilistic judgements should respond to the acquisition of new evidence. Unfortunately, in cases where S 1 / ∈ Σ 0 , Bayes' rule cannot be directly verified, as there was no prior belief regarding the likelihood of the conditioning event. The notion of commensurability, below, provides a simple resolution, advancing an observable restriction on (π 0 , π 1 ) equivalent extended Bayesianism.
Definition. Say that π 1 is commensurate to π 0 if
π1(E) > 0, and,
and where (1) holds with equality whenever F ⊆ S 1 . (We here associate x 0 with +∞ for all x ∈ R.) Remark 1. For all E ∈ Σ 0 with E ⊆ S 1 , π 0 (E) ≤ π 1 (E). This follows by setting F to Ω in (p1).
Remark 2. (p1) implies that π 1 is absolutely continuous with respect to π 0 : S 1 ⊆ S 0 . If this was not the case, then F , the smallest event in Σ 0 containing S 1 \ S 0 , is non-empty. Since F ∩ S 1 = ∅ and F ∩ S 0 = ∅, we must have π 1 (F ) > 0 but π 0 (F ) = 0. So then
Remark 3. If there exists a non-empty E ∈ Σ 0 with E ⊆ S 1 , then (p2) is implied by (p1). To see this note that for such E, we have for all F ∈ Σ 1 : 0 < π0(E) π1(E) ≤ π0(F ) π1(F ) , where Remark 2 establishes that 0 < π 0 (E). Theorem 1. π 1 is commensurate to π 0 if and only if (π 0 , π 1 ) satisfies EB.
The existence of the extensionsπ andπ ′ ensure the existence of an extensionπ ′′ .
Proof. The 'if' direction is easy: Assume (π 0 , π 1 ) satisfies EB withπ the mitigating measure. Take some E, F ∈ Σ 0 with E ⊆ S 1 . Then, by the properties ofπ,
for all E ∈ Σ 0 .
Towards the 'only if' direction, assume that π 1 is commensurate to π 0 . We must find aπ on (Ω, Σ 1 ) such that the conditions of EB hold. Since, Ω is denumerable, Σ 0 and Σ 1 are generated by partitions of Ω-call theses P 0 and P 1 , respectively-and it isuffices to specifyπ on the cells of P 1 .
But, first, we must set a value, β, forπ(S 1 ). If there exists an E ∈ Σ 0 with E ⊆ S 1 , then set
π1(E) . By (p1), the choice of E is irrelevant and by Remark 1, β ≤ 1. Further, Remark 2 indicates that 0 < β and following the logic of Remark 3 we have β ≤ inf S0 π0(E) π1(E) . If no such E exists, take an arbitrary 0 < β ≤ inf S0 π0(E) π1(E) ≤ 1. Now for all P ∈ P 1 with P ⊆ S 1 , setπ(P ) = βπ 1 (P ). For each Q ∈ P 0 , such that Q ⊆ S 1 , choose
, this is a well defined probability. For any remaining P ∈ P 1 , setπ(P ) = 0.
It is straightforward to verify thatπ is a witness to (π 0 , π 1 ) satisfying EB. First,π(S 1 ) = β > 0, so (ec1) is satified. Next, notice for all Q ∈ P 0 , such that Q ⊆ S 1 ,π(Q) = π 0 (Q) by construction.
If there is some Q ∈ P 0 , such that Q ⊆ S 1 , then β = π0(Q) π1(Q) , so thatπ(Q) = βπ 1 (Q) = π 0 (Q), and so (ec2) holds for all Q ∈ P 0 . Finally, for π 1 (E) = π 1 (E ∩ S 1 ) =π
π(S1) , so (ec3) holds.
Repeated Conditioning
If the DM discovers unforeseen evidence more than once, the observed subjective probabilities will form a finite sequence, π 0 . . . π N , over increasingly fine algebras, Σ 0 . . . Σ N . For a DM who adheres to Bayesianism to the extent possible under unawareness, each (π n , π n+1 ) will satisfy EB.
Even if the modeler cannot feasibly observe each π n , this hypothesis can be falsified, since under this assumption, (π n , π m ) will satisfy EB for all all π m with m ≥ n.
Theorem 2. The diagram in Figure 2 commutes.
Proof. This can be seen easily by appealing to Theorem 1: let π 1 be commensurate to π 0 and π 2 commensurate to π 1 . Appealing to (p1), we have
Similarly, appealing to (p2):
F ) which holds with equality whenever F ⊆ S 2 ⊆ S 1 . Thus, π 2 is commensurate to π 0 ; (π 0 , π 2 ) satisfies EB.
A Few Notes on Related Literature
Fagin and Halpern (1991) introduced the notion of outer and inner conditional probability as the upper and lower envelopes of the conditional probabilities of all possible extensions to a richer algebra. In the language of this paper, the outer conditional probability of π 0 on E ∈ Σ 1 is π * 0 (·|E) = sup{π(·|E) |π ∈ ∆(Ω, S 1 ),π extends π 0 } and the inner conditional probability is defined by replacing the sup and an inf. Thus it must be that (π 0 , π 1 ) satisfy EB exactly when π 1 lies inside of the outer and inner conditional probabilities (where the conditioning event is S 1 ) of π 0 . As such, filtering through inner and outer probability provides another, indirect, characterization of unforeseen posteriors.
As discussed in Footnote 2, Karni and Vierø (2013) consider two different ways to expand awareness. If we insist on entertaining expansions of the state-space itself so that Σ 0 is defined on Ω and Σ 1 on Ω∪Ω ′ , then we can appropriately generalize the definition of extended Bayesianism to allow π 1 to entertain probability on newly discovered states: Setting π 1 ∈ ∆(Ω ∪ Ω ′ , Σ 1 ), say (π 0 , π 1 ) satisfy generalized extended Bayesianism (GEB) if π 1 (Ω) > 0 and (π 0 , π 1 (· | Ω)) satisfy EB. In this case, we have that the overall transition (π 0 → π 1 ) satisfies reverse Bayesianism if and only if S 1 = Ω ∪ Ω ′ . Karni et al. (2018) consider the case where a DM, in the process of becoming more aware, might simultaneously condition her beliefs with respect to some event, E. The only consider expansions of the state space and not refinements of previously describable events (i.e., Ω expands to Ω ∪ Ω ′ but Σ 0 = {E ∩ Ω | E ∈ Σ 1 }). They introduce generalized reverse Bayesianism, whereby the relative probabilities of events must remain the same only for events in S 0 ∩ S 1 (rather than all of S 0 as is the case for RB). This case is clearly captured by GEB. The overall transition (π 0 → π 1 ), where π 1 is defined on (Σ 1 , Ω ∪ Ω ′ ), satisfies generalized reverse Bayesianism if and only if (π 0 , π 1 ) satisfy GEB and Σ 0 = {E ∩ Ω | E ∈ Σ 1 }.
